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Evaluation of Authentication and User Identification on Simultaneous Session Limitation Mechanism

Ryo SHIBAHARA and Keizo SAISHO
Kagawa University
2217-20 Hayashi-cho, Takamatsu 761-0396, Japan
s18g470@stu.kagawa-u.ac.jp, sai@eng.kagawa-u.ac.jp

ABSTRACT

Responsiveness of Web servers is lowered when they are overloaded caused by a lot of requests from clients. Moreover, Web servers are required to be not only available but also stable responsiveness especially for interactive Web applications. In this paper, a mechanism which limits the number of simultaneous sessions using firewall is proposed in order to provide stable Web services. The mechanism consists of authentication server, firewall and user identification server. Authentication server authenticates user and registers IP address of his machine with firewall when the number of current simultaneous sessions is less than the specified number. After this, authenticated users can access Web server via firewall and user identification server. By using firewall, it is possible to not only limit the number of simultaneous sessions but also block malicious attacks such as DoS attack. Unauthenticated users, however, can access the Web server without authentication when they use same NAT environment or proxy server as authenticated users. User identification server detects access from unauthenticated users and blocks them. Moreover, it limits the number of accesses per unit time in order to prevent attacks from authenticated malicious users. This paper describes evaluation of user authentication server and user identification server. From results of evaluations, we confirm that user authentication server can authenticate and has enough capacity, and user identification server has tolerance of attack with unauthenticated users and can limit the number of accesses per unit time.

KEYWORD

Limit of Simultaneous Sessions, Firewall, User Authentication and Identification, Web Service

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, various Web services are provided. Moreover, a lot of users can use Web services anywhere and anytime with the spread of smart phones. As the number of users increases, requests to Web servers also increase. Web server is overloaded when excessive requests issue to it. As a result, responsiveness of services is lowered and these services may not be available at the worst case. Thus, we developed simultaneous session limitation mechanism that limits the number of simultaneous sessions from authenticated users to solve such situation. The mechanism consists of authentication server, firewall and user identification server. By using firewall, it is possible to not only limit the number of simultaneous sessions but also block malicious attacks such as DoS attack. Authentication server authenticates user and registers IP address of his machine with firewall when the number of current simultaneous sessions is less than the specified number. After this, authenticated users can access Web server via firewall and user identification server. Unauthenticated users, however, can access the Web server without authentication when they use same NAT environment or proxy server as authenticated users. User identification server detects access from unauthenticated users and blocks them. We use cookie to identify sessions. By checking cookie, user identification server can detect whether session is formally authenticated. Moreover, we develop the mechanism which limits the number of ac-

cesses per unit time from authenticated users in order to prevent attacks from authenticated malicious users. This paper describes functional and performance evaluation of user authentication server and user identification server.

2 RELATED WORKS

In [1], a system aims to reduce load of the Web server is proposed. This system is achieved that all requests to origin Web server are redirected to the CAPTCHA nodes. The results of experiments show that the latency has increased but the load of the Web server has been reduced and the average response time has been significantly improved, compared to the case of accessing the Web server directly. This research is the same as our research in reducing the load on the web server. It cannot cope with many users accessing simultaneously, but our research can.

There are researches that relaxes user frustration even when Web server is overloaded[2][3]. In [2], WebQ, a system to improve user experience when accessing overloaded Web servers, is proposed. Users accessing a server protected by WebQ receive a HTTP redirect response specifying a wait time in the virtual queue, and are automatically redirected to the web server upon expiration of the wait time. The results of experiments show that requests can be processed normally and response time is also improved even if the load of Web server protected by the proposed system exceeds the capacity of the Web server. In [3], the mechanism which continues important services by lowering the quality of unimportant services rather than restricting users access when Web server is overloaded is proposed. From the results of experiments, it has been confirmed that the proposed approach is effective when Web server is overloaded. Our research can block the malicious attacks, but they cannot block.

In [4], a study aims to improve the https server performance. It proposes cipher suite selection algorithm to meet the different demands for security and response time, and strategy which reduces the response time for higher priority requests and guarantees the response time for lower priority requests, while reducing the average system response time. From the results of experiments, it has been confirmed that this study proves the efficiency of the method, and when the server load is high, the advantage of the strategy is more obvious. Our research restricts the number of sessions for improving responsiveness to allowed users, but they use strategy for improving performance.

There are researches that defend against DDoS attacks[5][6]. In [5], a system employs cloud-side proactive and reactive defenses to combat DDoS attacks that may target it. In the proactive defense, coordination server attempts to protect against botnet reconnaissance by periodically changing (via DNS) proxy IP addresses. In the reactive defense, all clients are supposed to use proxies that are overloaded could be periodically reassigned to (shuffled among) the attacked proxies at random. From the results of experiments with several cases, it has been confirmed this system worked well. Our research blocks accesses to Web server using firewall when it reaches upper limit, but their system uses proactive and reactive defenses of shuffling client-to-server assignments. In [6], authers propose XFirewall which is temporary firewall to prevent DDoS attacks. It is created in front of the normal firewall that either protects the server or the network when it is needed with customized policy rules and removed when the DDoS storm is over. Our research configures firewall rules based on authorisation, but XFirewall is configured based on the detected pattern.

There are researches that do access control for security and performance[7][8][9]. In [7], new fine-grained two-factor authentication (2FA) access control system with the necessity of both a user secret key and a lightweight security device is proposed. From the results of detailed security analysis and simulation, it has been confirmed to achieve the desired security requirements and to demonstrate the practicability of the proposed 2FA system. In [8], a 2-level fuzzy admission control algorithm to improve system throughput is proposed. The first level named load controller judges the load situation of each

tier by the resource consumption and requests delay. The second level named admission controller decides the admission rate of the current session by probability statistics. The experiments show that the algorithm can overcome the limitation of general admission control strategies and improve the system throughput. In [9], a design pattern for improving the performances of a distributed access control mechanism has been proposed. This mechanism has a central authorisation service. A client requests permission to access some services form the central authorisation service through LocalController. At this time, the LocalController caches authorisation information. When the client requests permission again, the LocalController permits the request using cached authorisation information. This drastically decreases the number of requests to the central authorisation service. The observations of the runtime behaviour of various occurrences of such a design pattern on real software systems have shown a drastic increase in performance when compared with a straightforward simpler implementation. Our research uses access control with user authentication and firewall.

3 SIMULTANEOUS SESSION LIMITATION MECHANISM

Figure 1 shows proposed the simultaneous session limitation mechanism. It consists of authentication server, firewall, user identification server. The authentication server (Auth server) authenticates users and allows them when the number of current sessions is less than the specific number. The firewall (IPF server) has additional functions that automatically update filtering rules. The user identification server (UI server) denies requests from unauthorized users. SS server really provides some kind of Web services. All users are supposed to access SS server via IPF server and UI server. The overview of steps to access SS server from user are shown below.

1. User requires access right to Auth server.
2. Auth server authenticates the user by his account and password and check the number of current sessions.
3. If the number is lower than upper limit then IPF server changes filtering rules and the Auth server informs UI server of the session information of the authenticated user.
4. Auth server informs the user of SS server's URL.
5. The user accesses to the URL. The access goes to UI server by DNS setting. The access can pass IPF server and reaches UI server.
6. UI server checks the session information. If the check is passed then UI server accesses SS server and returns result to the user. Otherwise, UI server sends the user the Web page which prompts to be authenticated.

4 DESIGN

We describe design of Auth server and UI server explained in the previous section.

4.1 Auth Server

Auth server has databases to manage user and session. The following two problems are considered at designing time.

- Protect Auth server from DoS attack
- Protect databases from malicious attack

It is possible to solve DoS attack problem by setting multiple Auth servers. However, this method causes synchronizing problem because



Figure 1: Structure of Simultaneous Session Limitation Mechanism



Figure 2: Steps to access SS server

each Auth server has databases. Thus, we introduce reverse proxy servers for Auth server. All accesses to Auth server are done via them. By restricting the number of accesses to Auth server at reverse proxy servers, Auth server can avoid overload. It is thinkable that reverse proxy servers deny accesses when the number of requests per second exceeds the specific number. Moreover, all accesses are denied when the number of simultaneous sessions exceeds the upper limit.

It is possible to avoid direct accesses from DoS attackers by setting Auth server inside firewall. This can also solve the second problem. The steps to access SS server by using reverse proxy are shown in Figure 2. The number and title correspond to those in Figure 2.

1. Access
   A user accesses any reverse proxy server.
2. Redirect to Auth server
   The user accesses Auth server by redirecting.
3. Login
   Auth server authenticates the user.
4. Refer session DB
   When the authentication succeeds, Auth server obtains the number of current sessions by referring session DB, and then checks whether it exceeds the upper limit or not.
5. Register session information
   If the check is passed, Auth server registers session information to session DB. Session information has cookie, IP address, expired time and so on.
6. Update filtering rules
   IPF server updates filtering rules according to the session information stored in session DB every 1 second. The operations are done. When the new session information is registered session DB, it is applied filtering rules at least after 1 second.
7. Send session information
   Auth server sends UI server session information every 1 second.
8. Inform SS server's URL
   Auth server informs the user SS server's URL via reverse proxy server.
9. Access to informed URL
   The user accesses to informed URL.
10. Check IP address
    IPF server passes the access to UI server if it is sent from permitted user.
11. Check cookie
    UI server checks cookie included the access.
12. Access to SS server
    If the check is passed, UI server accesses SS server and returns the result to the user. Otherwise, UI server sends the user the Web page which prompts to be authenticated.

4.2 UI Server

In the simultaneous session limitation mechanism, UI server identifies authenticated users by checking cookie. We considered two methods. The first method is to manage cookies using database built on UI server. The second method is to manage cookies using file. In order to reduce search time cookies are stored in multiple files. The file name is the hash value calculated from the value of cookie. We call the former method DB method and the latter method HASH method.

5 FUNCTIONAL TEST OF USER AUTHENTICATION METHOD

We performed functional test for authentication method.

5.1 Experiment Environment and Check Points

Figure 3 shows the experiment environment. We use virtual machines for reverse proxy server, Auth server, UI server and SS server. IPF server is physical machine which also hypervisor on which UI server and SS server run. Specifications of hypervisors are also shown in Figure 3. We implemented access deny function which denies when the number of simultaneous sessions reaches upper limit. The following points are tested by actually accessing from browsers.

- User can be authenticated and access SS server.
- User can't access SS server if the number of simultaneous sessions reaches upper limit.
- Reverse proxy server can deny accesses if the number of simultaneous sessions has already reached upper limit.



Figure 3: Experiment environment of functional test

5.2 Experiment Procedure

In this experiment, upper limit is set 2. This experiment uses three browsers: Google Chrome(user1), Safari(user2) and Firefox(user3). Since they store cookie independently, their sessions are identified individually. It is possible to use them on the same client. The steps to perform functional test are shown below.

Step-1 Users access to Auth server via reverse proxy server simultaneously with their browsers.

Step-2 user1 sends his account and password to Auth server.

Step-3 user2 sends his account and password to Auth server.

Step-4 user3 sends his account and password to Auth server.

Step-5 user3 accesses to Auth server via reverse proxy server again.

5.3 Result

Figure 4 to 8 show results of Step-1 to Step-5, respectively. Figure 4 shows the user1's screen only because other screens are slightly different, but the same content. At Step-2 and Step-3, user1 and user2 were authenticated successfully and got the response from SS server as shown Figure 5 and 6. On the other hand, user3 got the response from Auth server as shown Figure 7. Access to SS server from user3 was denied even though authentication of user3 succeeded because the number of simultaneous sessions reached the upper limit. In this experiment, the upper limit is 2. At Step-5, reverse proxy server denied the access from user3 because the number of simultaneous sessions already reached the upper limit and sent the message showing reason for the denial as shown Figure 8. The results show that our authentication method works as designed.



Figure 4: Login screen



Figure 5: Success to access SS server (user1)

Figure 6: Success to access SS server (user2)



Figure 7: Failure to access SS server (user3)

6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF USER AUTHENTICATION METHOD

In this section, performance of user authentication method is examined. In this experiment, user clients don't access to SS server in order to examine only authorisation.

6.1 Experiment Environment

Experiment environment is same as that of in Section 5 except Auth server. The capacity of Auth server is improved in order to examine the performance. The number of CPUs is 4, memory size is 20 GB and the number of worker processes is 32.



Figure 8: Denies accessing to Auth server by reverse proxy server

6.2 Experiment Procedure

In this experiment, upper limit of the number of simultaneous sessions is set a large enough number which never reaches the upper limit. The number of accesses from user clients per second is increases by 1 every 10 seconds from 1 to 100.

6.3 Result of Performances Experiment

Figure 9 and 10 show the results of the experiment. Green point and red point show successful and failed responses in figures, respectively. In Figure 9, access failure has begun around 350 seconds from the start of experiment (35 accesses per second). Response time lengthened and the number of failed responses also increased after 500 seconds. Figure 10 is part of Figure 9 up to 350 seconds. All accesses take less than 0.5 seconds despite the number of accesses per second exceeds the number of worker processes. From the results, we confirm that user authentication method has enough speed to process user authentication.



Figure 9: Result of authentication method



Figure 10: Result of authentication method in 300 seconds



Figure 11: Result of hard limitation



Figure 12: Result of soft limitation

7 SOFT UPPER LIMITATION VS. HARD UPPER LIMITATION

In this section, we describe about soft and hard upper limitation and evaluate them.

7.1 Discussion on Upper Limitation

When the number of current sessions are nearly at the upper limit, it occurs a problem that some users is authenticated successfully but they are denied to access to SS server. This isn't a problem if the service is provided to first fix number arrivals. However, when the service uses this system to keep responsiveness, this is a problem. In that case, the number of current sessions exceeds the upper limit a little is not a problem. All users who can access to Auth server should be allowed accessing to SS server. We call the way denies the users to access when the number of current sessions exceeds the upper limit hard limitation, and call the way allows the users who have already accessed to Auth server when the number of current sessions reaches the upper limit soft limitation.

7.2 Experiment Procedure

We use same environment in Section 6. In this experiment, upper limit of the number of simultaneous sessions is set 200 and the user client issues 4 accesses every second for 6 minutes. Valid session time is set 1 minute.

7.3 Experiment Result

Figure 11 and 12 show the results. Green point shows successful response, red point shows failed response and blue point shows response denied at reverse proxy server. Figure 11 is the result using hard limitation. In Figure 11, failures exist between green point group and blue point group, and response time of them is longer than that of successful and denied. We thought that some users are denied after authenticated successfully because the number of current sessions reached the upper limit while they are authenticating. Hard limitation will cause this situation. Figure 12 shows result using soft limitation. Although a few successful accesses have longer response time than others, maximum response time is less than 2 seconds. Soft limitation allowed 203 users to access SS server despite the upper limit is 200. Failed response is not appeared in this experiment. Only 3 users are addtionally allowed to access SS server. From the experiment, we confirmed that soft limitation is effective to use the service which sets upper limitation to keep responsiveness.

8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF UI SERVER

In this section, performance of UI server is examined using two methods: DB methos and HASH method.

8.1 Experiment Environment

Figure 13 shows experiment environment. All servers and user clients are built as virtual machines on hypervisors which specifications are shown in Table 1. User clients are built on hypervisor1 and hypervisor2, UI server is built on hypervisor3 and SS servers are built on hypervisor4 and hypervisor5. UI server uses Nginx[10], Lua[11] and lua-nginx-module[12]. SS servers use Apache2.4.18[13]. The reason for using multiple SS servers is to prevent them from becoming bottleneck.



Figure 13: Experiment environment

	CPU	Memory
Hypervisor1	Intel Core i5-3470	16GB
Hypervisor2	Intel Core i5-4460	16GB
Hypervisor3	Intel Xeon E5-2620	32GB
Hypervisor4	Intel Xeon E5-2620	32GB
Hypervisor5	Intel Xeon E5-2620	32GB

Table 1: Specification of hypervisor

8.2 Experiment Procedure

We performed two experiments. One examines throughput of UI server, the other examines capacity of blocking accesses from malicious users.

This first experiment uses 5 user clients and 10 SS servers. The scenario is shown below. The number of accesses per second from each client is increases by N every 30 seconds from 20 accesses per second up to E (maximum number of accesses per second).

The second experiment uses 6 user clients and 10 SS servers. 1 user client plays authenticated users and issues accesses with fixed number of access per second (C). Other user clients play malicious users and issue accesses with same manner as the first experiment. We call accesses from authenticated user and malicious user $Access_A$ and $Access_M$.

8.3 Experiment Result

Figure 14 and 15 show the result of the first experiment with DB method and HASH method, respectively. In this experiment, N and E are set 20 and 600, respectively. Total N and E become 100 and 3000, since the number of clients is 5. The results of each user client are slightly different. These figures show the results of 1 user client. Histogram in figures shows the number of responses per second and the scale is shown by left vertical axis. Green part and red part show successful and failed responses, respectively. Orange line graph shows the number of requests waiting for response and the scale is shown by right vertical axis. Horizontal axis shows times of day.

First, we examine the result of DB method. In Figure 14, access failure has begun around 300 seconds from the start of experiment (1,100 accesses per second) and the number of requests waiting for response gradually increases. Only about to 250 ($= 50 \times 5$ clients) accesses per second were successful after 360 seconds (1,300 accesses per second).

Next, we examine the result of HASH method. In Figure 15, access failure has begun around 480 seconds from the start of experiment (1,700



Figure 14: Using database method



Figure 15: Divided files using hash method

accesses per second) and the number of requests waiting for response also gradually increases. After this, the number of successful accesses per second was decreased gradually and finally reached about 1,750 ($= 350 \times 5$ clients).

Figure 16 and 17 show the result of the second experiment with DB method and HASH method, respectively. In this experiment, C, N and E are set 100, 20 and 1,800, respectively. Total N and E become 100 and 9000, since the number of clients playing malicious users is 5. These figures show the number of responses to authenticated user's.

First, we examine the result of DB method. In Figure 16, failure of $Access_A$ per second has begun around 480 seconds from the start of experiment (1,700 $Access_M$s per second). After this, the number of successful $Access_A$ per second is about 30 (30%).

Next, we examine the result of HASH method. In Figure 17, failure of $Access_A$ per second has begun around 2220 seconds from the start of experiment (7,500 $Access_M$s per second). However, the number of $Access_A$ failures per second was less than equal to 3 obtained from log analysis.

From the first experiment, HASH method can process accesses about 1.6 times of DB method when all accesses are issued from authenticated users. From the second experiment, the tolerance of malicious access of HASH method is much higher than that of DB method. We think that HASH method has enough capacity and tolerance of malicious accesses.



Figure 16: Using database method



Figure 17: Divided files using hash method

9 CONTROLLING THE NUMBER OF ACCESSES PER UNIT TIME

We describe controlling the number of accesses per unit time and evaluate it.

9.1 Design of Access Control

If malicious users are authenticated, they can attack UI server and SS server such as DoS attacks. We must take measure against attacks after authentication. We think that it is possible to prevent the situation by restricting user to access SS server when the number of accesses from him per unit time exceeds designated value. This method, however, cannot block attack on UI server. It is possible to prevent the attack by requesting IPF server from UI server to block it. We implemented only the former function. In the future, we will implement the latter function.

9.2 Experiment Environment and Procedure

In this experiment, we use UI server, SS server and user client as shown Figure 18. We examine three cases 30, 50 and 90 that are the upper

limit of the number of accessing to SS server per second. The scenario is shown below. The number of accesses per second from an user client is increases by 1 every 10 seconds from 1 up to 100. After that, user client keeps to issue 100 accesses for 3 minutes. Finally, the number of accesses per second from an user client is decreases by 1 every 10 seconds down to 0.



Figure 18: Experiment environment

9.3 Result

Figure 19, 20 and 21 show the results of experiment. In these figures, blue and red points show successful and failed responses, respectively. Green line shows the number of accesses per second and red line shows the upper limit. All figures can confirm that all accesses failed when the number of accessing to SS server exceeds the upper limit. These results show that this function works as designed.



Figure 19: upper limit 30

10 CONCLUSION

We proposed simultaneous session limitation mechanism and implemented reverse proxy server, authentication server and user identification server that are comprised it. Reverse proxy servers and authentication server cooperate to authenticate users and to limit the number of sessions. We confirmed that these functions work correctly and implemented authentication method has enough speed to process user authentication. Addtionally, we implemented soft limitation and confirmed that it is effective for the service which sets upper limitation to keep responsiveness. We also implemented two user identification methods, DB method and HASH method, for user identification server. From the results of experiments, HASH method is superior to DB method and has enough capacity and tolerance of malicious accesses. Also, we implemented controlling the number of accesses per unit time. We confirmed that it works correctly.

Future works is shown below.

- Implementation of access deny function which denies accesses at reverse proxy servers when the number of requests per second exceeds the specific number.

- Implementation of prevention function to block accesses using IPF server when the accesses from authenticated malicious users cannot be processed by UI server.



Figure 20: upper limit 50



Figure 21: upper limit 90

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