

## MALWARE ANALYSIS OF BACKDOOR CREATOR : FATRAT

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### ABSTRACT

Malwares have become the new vector of cyber crime and hackers are finding new ways to propagate these in all available platforms. Hackers are using social media to propagate backdoors to install it in victim machines to acquire their important data and resources. In the present scenario, Several automatic readymade tools are available over internet using which any script kiddies can create a dangerous malwares and victimize his target. These malware generator are also have categories & generations. It is important to understand that, all the available malware generator previously used in actual scenario of crime of stealing data either in dark net or as a paid service. It is important to understand the working and efficiency of such malware generator . So, In this paper we analyze FATRAT, a backdoor creator which is one of its type and investigate the details with artifacts about it.

### KEYWORDS

Malware, Backdoor, FATRAT, JPEG, Malicious Image, Malware forensics

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In the past few years of cyber world, cybercriminals are implementing new techniques to hide their malicious code inside other files in such a fashion that it is undetected by antivirus.. For it, they are using several complex infection processes than the previous one. As the technology changes, the new generation of cyber criminals are now putting their steps forward. They are now leaving traditional cybercrimes and using advance techniques where the malicious payload is hidden in encrypted files – which ever be the known file format. There are several example over internet in which cyber attacks or incidents shows that attackers are using sophisticated techniques.

In September 2016, Cisco talos-intel identified an exploitable out-of-bounds vulnerability present in the JPEG 2000 image file format parser which is implemented in OpenJPEG library and now identify by its TALOS-2016-0193 identification number or Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures CVE-2016-8332. This JPEG 2000 is a file format which is specially used for embedding images inside the PDF documents. This specific vulnerability is so dangerous that it allow attacker to write out-of-bound heap which include the heap corruption and then arbitrary code execution is possible [1]. In March 2016 Kaspersky Lab, catch a malicious payload hidden in the PNG file i.e. it is embedded with the PNG file. This attack starts with a simple phishing PDF [2].

Such types of incidents shows that now images over the internet are not seen as innocent. They now can be a medium to compromise the protected system. The attacker manipulate the images and these images are harmless until a trigger or input is given in the form of double click done by the user on that image which immediately start a malicious activity [3].

Researchers of Sucuri in July 2013 reported an incident where they found an backdoor present on a site that which was compromised. This backdoor did not depend on the normal patterns like base64 and gzip encoding which is used to hide the contents contained within it [3].

This backdoor is divided into two parts. Both of part are functions in which the first part is a mix of *exif\_read\_data* function which is used to read the image headers and the *preg\_replace* function which is used to execute the content. both PHP functions are actually stored its data within the EXIF header location of a JPEG image.

```
$exif = exif_read_data('/homepages/clientsitepath/  
images/stories/food/bun.jpg');  
preg_replace($exif['Make'],$exif['Model'],");
```

Both functions are harmless by themselves. However, preg\_replace has a tricky and hidden options. On passing "/"e" modifier it execute the content(eval), instead of just searching /replacing [3]. On looking to bun.jpg file, second part of backdoor looks like:

```
ÿÿÿà^@^PJFIF^@^A^B^@^@^d^@^d^@^@  
ÿá^@; Exif^@^@II^*^@^H^@^@^@^B^@^  
O^A^B^@^F^@^@^@^&^@^@^@^P^A^B^  
@m^@^@^@^,^@^@^@^ ^@^@^@^@^./.*e^  
@ eval ( base64_decode("aWYgKG1zc2V0K  
CRfUE9TVFsie noxII0pKSB7ZXZhbChzdHJ  
pcHNsYXNoZXMoJF9QT1NUWyJ6ejEiXSk  
pO30='));@ÿÿ^@^QDucky^@^A^@^D^@^@  
^@<^@^@ÿÿ^@^NAdobe^
```

This types of incident show that, over internet, there are several freely available tools which are used to hide the malicious payload inside the images. FATRAT is one of them. It is a massive exploiting tool which is easy to understand and create backdoor. This tool compiles a malware with popular payload and then the compiled malware can be execute on windows, android, mac . The malware that created with this tool also have an ability to bypass most AV software protection .This tool is used to post exploitation attack like browser attack, dll, bypass AV, etc. In this paper, We compile the malware and payload with the JPEG images and make it a malicious image. After it, analysis is done in our own malware analysis setup lab and show the result.

In this paper, we analyze the backdoor creator and demonstrate the Practical approach which are used by the security personals or researcher to find out the hidden files or proving the presence of hidden data inside the image.

## 2. FATRAT

The Fatrat is a massive exploiting tool [4]. It create backdoor for windows, linux, mac and android. It can bypass antivirus. It checks for metasploit service and start if not present. It is capable of crafting meterpreter reverse\_tcp, start multiple meterpreter reverse\_tcp listners. It uses the fast search in searchsploit and many more. The functions provided by the fatrat are:

- 1) Create backdoor with msfvenom
- 2) Create FUD 100% Backdoor [slow but powerfull ]
- 3) Create FUD Backdoor with Avoid 1.2
- 4) Create FUD 100% Backdoor with backdoor-factory [embed]
- 5) Backdooring Original apk [Instagram, Line, etc ]
- 6) Create Fud Backdoor 1000% with PwmWinds [Excelent]
- 7) Create Backdoor For office with Microsploit
- 8) Create auto listeners
- 9) Jump to msfconsole
- 10) Searchsploit
- 11) File Pumper [Increase Your Files Size]
- 12) Configure Default Lhost & Lport
- 13) Cleanup



Figure 1 :- Home Screen of Fatrat [5]

The FATRAT facilitate the following facilities under different section shown below:-



Figure 2: PawnWinds to create Powershell [6]



Figure 5: Creator for different platform [7]




Figure 3: BackDooring for .apk files [6]




Figure 6: Shell to bypass Antivirus [8]



Figure 4 : SlowButPowerFull meterpreter [7]



Figure 7: Creating Listeners for Payload [8]

## 2. FATRAT ANALYSIS

Using FATRAT, several samples are created using different functionality provided and discussed previously:

**Step 1: Hashing :** A Fingerprint for malware-Hashing is used to uniquely identify malware. For it Message Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5) hash function is commonly used.




Figure 8: Hash value of the sample

*Output Hash :*

456b283820a1e066c766f39ce6e941ac

### Step 2: Finding Strings:




Figure 9: Presence of powershell and mingw

*Output :* Presence of powershell.exe in hidden mode detected Presence of Mingw detected but failed during execution

### Step 3: Detecting Packers with PEiD




Figure 10: Searching for packers




Figure 11: Extra information of sample

*Output:-* Sample is not packed with any kind of UPX, beside it on digging gets Magic literal: PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI)

**Step 4:** Check PE Files Headers and Sections with Image file header




Figure 12: Image file header information

**Final Output:**

**Target machine** Intel 386 or later processors and compatible processors

**Compilation timestamp** 2017-05-18 00:45:53

**Entry Point** 0x000014C0

**Number of sections** 15

**Step 5:** Analysis using IDA Pro. In this step, we show to difference of real genuine Image vs Malicious crafted coded Image.

**Real Image :-** As we see in IDA pro disassembler, there is no import or export funtions are used as it is a real genuine Image.




Figure. 13: No import functions in real Image




Figure 14: No export functions in real Image

**Malicious crafted coded Image.:-** There are several import or export functions are used.

**Same file but with Embedded codes**




Figure 15(a): Import functions in crafted Image




Figure 15(b): Import functions in crafted Image

```
Imports from msvcrt.dll
extrn __dllonexit
extrn __getmainargs
extrn __initenv
extrn __lconv_init
extrn __set_app_type
extrn __setusermatherr
extrn _acmdl_n
extrn _amsg_exit
extrn _cexit
extrn _fmode
extrn _initterm
extrn _iob
extrn _lock
extrn _onexit
extrn exit
extrn fprintf
extrn free
extrn fwrite
extrn malloc
extrn memcpy
extrn signal
extrn strlen
extrn strcmp
extrn _unlock
extrn abort
extrn system
extrn vfprintf
extrn calloc
```

Figure 15(c): Import functions in crafted Image

```
payload - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
powershell.exe -nop -wind hidden -Exec Bypass -nomi -enc aQBMACgAwWBJAG4Ad
AAbAA3AG4AUgBXAEkAbgBhADkATQA3AHYAUABQAHYAUABNAGOATgAWADQAcwBBFAFgAbABnAGIAI
GIAMwBwAFMAagBwADMAQQBxAGkAQQBDAE4AUQA5AFIAKwBnADMAYWBIAG4AZABPAFIAZWA0ADc.
AFQAZgBTahQAVABMAEQACABaAC8AeQBZAFMAQGBHAGEATWBCAEIAegBZADKAUQBPafQAZwBUAGI
hAGKANABxADkAdQAZAESAdAA1AHEATABUAGIAQwBjAHQANwBMAE8ANAB1AG5AUQAXAGQASQB5A
```

Figure 17: Shellcode embedded with image

**Step 8 :-** Analyzing the genuine Image vs Malicious crafted coded Image in Hex Editor Neo

```
Hex Editor Neo (Administrator)
File Edit View Select Operations Bookmarks NTFSStreams Tools History Window Help
_1_BlackworldMap.jpg X
00000174 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00000000 ff d8 ff e0 00 10 4a 46 49 46 00 01 02 01 00 48 i0vã. .JFIF... .H
00000010 00 48 00 00 ff db 00 43 00 0a 06 06 09 06 09 0c .H. .ÿü.C.....
00000020 0a 0a 0c 0f 0c 09 0c 0f 1e 0f 0f 0f 0f 12 18 15 .....
00000030 15 15 15 23 18 21 2d 1b 1b 1b 1b 2d 37 37 37 21 ...#!.-...-777!
00000040 21 37 21 21 24 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 24 3c !?!$<<<<<<<<<<
00000050 3c 54 3c 3c 54 3c 3c 3c 3c ff db 00 43 01 1b 1b <T<<<<<<<<ÿü.C...
00000060 1b 23 1c 23 41 23 23 41 87 5b 5b 5b 87 87 9a 9a .#. #A##A+[[[##ÿÿ
00000070 9a 9a 87 87 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 87 87 9c 9c 9c 9c ÿÿ#+######+#####
00000080 9c 87 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c 9c æ#####
```

Figure 18: Genuine Image header

```
IDA - C:\Users\w7U_Malware_lab\Desktop\JPEG SAMPLES\FakeImageExplo
File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help
IDA View-A Hex View-A Exports Imports Names Function
Name Address Ordinal
TlsCallback_0 004018D0
TlsCallback_1 00401880
start 004014C0
```

Figure 16: Export functions in crafted Image

**Step 7:-** Opening shellcode

As there are lots of Import functions hide inside the images and using on executing it.




Figure 19: Malicious crafted coded Image header




Figure 21: Other critical functions implanted in crafted image

During the searching of artifacts, we find out the attacker IP and powershell in hidden




Figure 20: Artifact of malicious images




Figure 22: Memory function used in hidden form

## CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK

Malicious payload which is hide using FATRAT are hard to detect & this scheme is generally used by the criminal to act maliciously in other area. For it, they generally used the various types of file format in which JPEG is the most innocent one. So, the challenges of scanning billions of image which are crossing the organization borders, irrelevant to their size, which are non-impacting anomalies are huge.

This provide an opportunity to the malware authors to take it as a advantage and using it to hide malicious code which leave an organization, stealthily send commands to infected victim and transferring various types of malwares across existing types of defenses. So as a researcher it is required to analyze such types samples and detect the images containing the malicious content in the real time scenario.

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